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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Section 78-2-2(3)(j) UCA 
(1953, as amended). This matter is subject to assignment to the Utah Court of Appeals, and 
has been transferred, pursuant to Section 78-2-2(4), UCA (1953, as amended). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
a. Did the trial court err in denying Hatch's Motion to Dismiss Davis's 
Malicious Prosecution Claim, since Hatch's claims had not been previously 
terminated in favor of Davis? 
This is reviewed under the correctness standard. Hall v. Utah State 
Dept. of Corrections, 24 P.3d 958 (Utah 2001). 
b. Did the trial court err in denying Hatch's Motion to Dismiss Davis's 
Abuse of Process Claim, since Hatch's claims had not been previously terminated 
in favor of Davis? Did Davis properly allege an Abuse of Process Claim? 
This is reviewed under the correctness standard. Hall v. Utah State 
Dept. of Corrections. 24 P.3d 958 (Utah 2001), 
c. Did the trial court err in dismissing the Malicious Prosecution Claim, 
after 4 days of trial, without telling the jury of the dismissal? The trial court 
was confused with the difference between Malicious Prosecution and Abuse of 
Process; was the jury also confused? 
Whether the jury is properly instructed is reviewed under a correctness 
standard. Collins v. Wilson. 984 P.2d 960 (Utah 1999). 
d. Does an Abuse of Process Claim in Utah require two elements, (1) an ulterior 
motive, and (2) an overt willful act in use of the proceeding, not proper in the regular 
conduct of the proceedings? Did Davis allege an Abuse of Process Claim? 
Since this is a legal question, it should be reviewed for correctness. Steffensen 
v. Smith Management Corp., 862 P.2d 1342 (Utah 1993). 
e. Was the jury properly instructed on the necessary elements for the Abuse of 
Process Claim? 
The proper instruction of the jury is reviewed for correctness. Steffensen v. 
Smith Management Corp., 862 P.2d 1342 (Utah 1993). 
f. Did the trial court err in ruling that the re-filing of the claims was allowed 
under Utah's Saving Statute (§78-12-40 U.C.A.) and then allow the jury to find it 
an abuse of process based upon the same facts? 
This is a question of law for the court to decide, it should be reviewed for 
correctness. Steffensen v. Smith Management Corp., 862 P.2d 1342 (Utah 1993). 
g. Was there a lack of probable cause, necessary for Abuse of Process 
after the court denied Davis's Motion to Dismiss Hatch's claims, at the end 
of Hatch's case-in-chief, and found sufficient evidence to go to the jury on 
both of Hatch's claims. 
The lack of probable cause for Abuse of Process is a legal question.. Westar 
Mortgage Corp. v. Jackson, 61 P.3d 823 (N.M. 2002). It should be reviewed for 
correctness. Steffensen v. Smith Management Corp., 862 P.2d 1342 (Utah 1993). 
2 
h. Was there "extreme and outrageous46 conduct by Hatch under an 
objective standard sufficient to sustain a claim of Intentional Infliction of Emotional 
Distress? 
In challenging the sufficiency of evidence, the evidence in support of 
the verdict must be marshaled and demonstrated to be insufficient when 
viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. State v. Hopkins, 989 
P.2d 1065 (Utah 1999). 
i. Did Davis actually suffer severe emotional distress under an subjective 
standard as a proximate result of any extreme and outrageous conduct by 
Hatch? Was there sufficient evidence to support an award of $87,000 for 
Davis' emotional distress when he had no actual damages? 
In challenging the sufficiency of evidence, the evidence in support of 
the verdict must be marshaled and demonstrated to be insufficient when viewed 
in the light most favorable to the verdict. State v. Hopkins, 989 P.2d 1065 
(Utah 1999). 
j . Was Davis's claim for emotional distress for actions which occurred in 
the early 1990s barred by Utah's four (4) year statute of limitations. § 78-12-25(3)? 
Did the court err in failing to give a jury instruction on this issue? 
A challenge to jury instructions is reviewed under a correctness standard. 
Steffensen v. Smith Management Corp., 862 P.2d 1342 (Utah 1993). 
k. Is the "presence requirement" necessary in Utah for the tort of intentional 
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Infliction of Emotional Distress for actions directed towards a third-party, as 
stated in Restatement (Second) Of Torts § 46(b)(2). 
This deals with the application of law, which should be reviewed under 
the correctness standard. Steffensen v. Smith Management Corp., 862 P.2d 
1342 (Utah 1993). 
1. Does Hatch have a Constitutional right to be critical of public officials 
and to petition the government with his grievances? Is harassment the proper 
limit to this right or is Davis required to allege and prove by clear and convincing 
evidence that the statements were false and published with "actual malice"? 
This should be reviewed under a correctness standard. Steffensen v. 
Smith Management Corp., 862 P.2d 1342 (Utah 1993). 
m. Did the trial court err in allowing expert testimony beyond the information 
contained in the depositions, after the court ruled at the Pre-trial Conference 
that such testimony would not be allowed, because disclosure of the expert's 
testimony was untimely? Did Hatch's counsel have a right to rely upon the 
trial court's ruling at the Pre-Trial Conference? 
This issue is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Wright, 
765 P.2 12, 14 (Ut.App. 1988); State v. Adams, 5 P.3d 642 (Utah 2000). 
n. Did the trial court fail to properly instruct the jury on the Intentional 
Infliction of Emotional Distress claim for a public official? 
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A challenge to jury instructions is reviewed under a correctness standard. 
Steffensen v. Smith Management Corp.. 862 P.2d 1342 (Utah 1993) 
o. Did the trial court err in ordering that no real or personal property be 
transferred by Hatch prior to judgment being entered, under Rule 69(q) 
U.R.C.P.? Does such an Order violate Utah's Exemption Act? Was Hatch 
ever personally served with this Order, as required under Rule 69? 
The review of statutory interpretation is a correctness standard, with no 
deference to the trial court. Reedeker v. Salisbury. 952 P.2d 577 (Ut.App.1998). 
p. Did the trial court err in issuing supplemental proceedings on a Partial 
Judgment, which specifically reserved issues for further determination; and 
before a final judgment was entered. 
The review of statutory interpretation is a correctness standard, with no 
deference to the trial court. Reedeker v. Salisbury. 952 P.2d 577 (Ut.App. 
1998). 
STANDARD FOR REVIEW 
The standard of review for each of the above-numbered issues, is set forth 
above, following the statement of each issue. 
PRESERVATION FOR REVIEW 
The issues presented above, which require preservation, were preserved for 
review, in Petitioners' memoranda filed with the trial court to Dismiss the Amended 
Counterclaim (Rec. 52-57); 
and for Summary Judgment (Rec. 282-454). The issues, including the testimony of the 
expert witness, were also raised in a Motion in Limine (Rec. 654-659), a Second Motion to 
Exclude Expert Testimony (Rec. 688-695), and at the time of trial (Trans. Vol. II, pg 549-
551) objections to the jury instructions were also made on the record. (Trans. Vol. II. pg 
733-734). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Hatch was pushed and his life was threatened by Davis at a special Boulder 
Town public hearing, where the Town's building program was being discussed. Hatch was 
being denied a building license, as well as business licenses by the Town. The Town's 
building program was being illegally operated. (Rec. 1-3) As a result, Hatch filed a federal 
civil rights suit (42 U.S.C. § 1983) against the Town of Boulder based on the denial of his 
civil rights, and lack of due process, in the issuance of these licenses. (Rec. 10-24) Hatch 
also filed a claim against Larry Davis in the federal action, for the assault and battery that 
occurred at the public hearing held to discuss the Town's Building Program. (Rec. 22-23) 
Larry Davis filed a motion to be dismissed from the federal action based on jurisdictional 
grounds and the fact that it was not part of a public hearing. The minutes from the meeting 
lacked the fact that a public hearing was held during the recess of the Town Meeting.1 The 
federal court did not find a common nexus with the federal claims and so Davis was 
dismissed from the federal lawsuit on or about March 17, 1997. (Rec. 110-112) Davis 
]At trial in this case, Judith Davis the Town Clerk admitted that there was indeed a 
public hearing during the recess of the Town Meeting and that the recess was taken specifically 
to hold a public hearing on the building inspection program. (Trans. Vol. I, pg. 330-335) 
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sought attorneys fees incurred in defending the action in federal court, which was denied. 
Hatch went on to prevail against the Town of Boulder in the federal lawsuit and was awarded 
$86,000.00, plus attorneys fees. (Rec. 397-398). 
On March 16, 1998, within a year of Davis's dismissal from the federal 
lawsuit, Hatch filed his assault and battery claim against Davis in Garfield County. (Rec. 1-
3) Davis filed an Answer and Counterclaim on July 21,1998, alleging Abuse of Process and 
Malicious Prosecution, based on Hatch's re-filing of the lawsuit in state court after its 
dismissal from federal court. (Rec. 4-24) The basis of Davis's claims was that the action 
was brought, "without any hope of success and to intimidate the residents of the town as well 
as the town council to comply with Hatch's narrow and peculiar political and philosophical 
positions." Davis claimed that Hatch had waged a campaign of hate and terror towards not 
only him, but his family, and the residents of Boulder. (Rec. 5-6). 
On August 11, 1998, Hatch filed a Motion to Dismiss the Counterclaim on 
grounds that all of the elements, including termination of the initial proceeding in favor of 
Davis, had not been met in order to state such claims. (Rec. 25). 
Before the court ruled on Hatch's Motion to Dismiss, Davis filed an Amended 
Answer and Counterclaim on May 6,1999, including two additional actions, for Intentional 
Infliction of Emotional Distress and for Attorney's Fees, based on Utah's bad faith statute. 
(Rec. 60) On May 20,1999, Hatch filed a Motion to Dismiss the Amended Counterclaim, 
again based on the grounds that all of the elements, including termination of the initial 
proceeding in favor of Davis, had not been satisfied to state such a claim. (Rec. 50). 
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On July 21,1999, before the court ruled on Hatch's Motion to Dismiss, Davis 
filed a Motion to Dismiss based on the statute of limitations, § 78-12-29 U.C.A. (Rec. 85) 
Davis also filed a Motion to Amend the Amended Counterclaim (Rec. 113), with a Second 
Amended Counterclaim and Answer, to include the statute of limitations as an affirmative 
defense. (Rec. 115-123) The court denied Davis's Motion to Dismiss based on the statute 
of limitations, ruling that Utah's saving statute, § 78-12-40 U.C. A., extended the time period 
for one year after the federal court dismissal, and that the Complaint filed on March 16, 
1998, was timely. (Rec. 172). 
Finally, on October 14,1999, the trial court denied Hatch's Motion to Dismiss 
the Amended Counterclaim (although Davis never filed a memorandum in opposition to the 
second Motion to Dismiss, the trial court treated the first response as if it had been filed to 
the later Motion to Dismiss, Rec. 178-179). The basis of the court's ruling was that the 
termination of the underlying action was not a prerequisite and that "this case appears to be 
in the 'unusual' category." Relying on the language in Baird v. Intermountain School Fed. 
Credit Union. 555 P.2d 877 (Utah 1976). (Rec. 33, 178-179). 
The parties proceeded with discovery and Hatch's counsel deposed Davis and 
asked him what specific facts constituted Abuse of Process or Malicious Prosecution, to 
which he responded the re-filing of the lawsuit in state court after it was dismissed in federal 
court; and that the claims made against him were untrue. (Rec. 299-300, 324) The 
emotional distress dealt with Hatch's dealings with Davis's wife in the federal lawsuit (which 
Hatch won), and complaints and requests for information, that Hatch had written to the Utah 
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State Park Department and other governmental officials, regarding the operation of Anasazi 
State Park from 1990 to 1993. Davis claims that these letters and requests for information 
caused him stress on the job. (Rec. 307, 322). 
Hatch sought discovery of Davis's employment file from the State of Utah 
(Rec. 206-207), which was denied by the court. (Rec. 240-244) In March of 2001 the trial 
court finally agreed to review the employment file in camera, but would only release what 
it thought to be discoverable and relevant information. (Rec. 274) The employment file 
showed prior complaints of Davis in the past, and stress in dealing with a former employee, 
but did not mention Hatch at all. 
Hatch filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on April 27, 2001, again 
claiming that the elements for Abuse of Process and Malicious Prosecution had not been met; 
and that the facts testified to by Davis in his deposition were not sufficient to support these 
claims. Hatch also sought dismissal of the Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress claim, 
since the letters he had written to his governmental representatives, could not be deemed 
"outrageous conduct," under an objective standard, and Davis did not suffer any severe 
emotional distress. Hatch also claimed that the letter writing occurred over four years ago, 
and was thus, barred by the four year statute of limitations § 78-12-25(3) U.C.A.; and any 
claim based on Hatch's dealing with Judith Davis is baseless (she never testified of distress); 
and Hatch's dealings with Judith Davis cannot be grounds for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, since Hatch had a right to complain, as evidence by his victory in the 
federal lawsuit; and would be barred anyway by the "presence requirement," since Mr. 
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Davis was not present when any alleged conduct took place. Restatement (Second) Of Torts 
§ 46(b)(2). (Hatch's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment is located 
at Rec. 281-454). 
The court denied Hatch's Motion for Summary Judgment ruling that the filing 
of the 1996 lawsuit may constitute an act of wrongful use of civil proceeding, stating that 
"wrongful use of civil proceedings "means to sue someone without a good reason and lose 
the lawsuit."(Rec. 587-589) The court then goes on with an analysis of "ex parte" 
proceedings, when there was no question regarding any ex parte proceedings presented in 
the case. (Rec. 588) This is contained in the court's Order of July 5, 2001. (Rec. 587-589). 
In July 2001, after receiving this ruling, Hatch filed a Petition for an Interlocutory Appeal, 
feeling that he should not be required to proceed in this matter when these claims should 
have been dismissed. (Rec. 591) This Petition was denied on September 12, 2001. (Rec. 
613). The presence of these claims prejudiced Hatch on his assault and battery claims at 
trial.2 
In September 2001, the trial court had not yet reviewed the employment file 
of Davis and so the original trial date in September 2001, was continued. A Scheduling 
Order was entered on January 2, 2002, setting trial for April 2nd, 3rd ,4th and 5th. (Rec. 
625-626) Hatch filed a Motion to Disqualify Judge David L. Mower from presiding in the 
2Rather than finding a lack of probable cause to bring the claims under a legal 
determination, the jury found against Hatch on a preponderance of the evidence standard and 
then based on that improperly found abuse of process. 
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case.3 On January 31, 2002, Judge David L. Mower recused himself from the case. (Rec. 
647) Under the Scheduling Order, Davis had until December 8, 2002 to disclose both fact 
and expert witnesses, including expert testimony. (Rec. 625) This information was never 
properly disclosed to Hatch's counsel and a discovery request was filed for this information 
by Hatch on January 16, 2002. (Rec. 644-645) On February 20, 2002, a Motion in Limine 
was filed before the final pretrial to exclude: any expert's testimony; any correspondence 
with Davis's wife, when Mr. Davis was not present; and any letters written by Hatch to 
government or state officials. (Rec. 654-659). 
At the March 11, 2002 Pre-trial Conference, Hatch requested Judge Mclff to 
go back and review Judge Mower's previous rulings, including the court's refusal to dismiss 
the Counterclaims. The court indicated that it would not go back and review any previous 
decisions. (Rec. 670) The trial court found that the expert testimony provided was not 
adequate and Davis was required to make his expert available for deposition by the end of 
next week.(Rec. 670) The next day, Hatch's counsel noticed up the deposition of Davis's 
expert on March 21, 2002, for which she failed to appear. (Rec. 672-674) On March 22, 
2002 Hatch filed a Second Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony. (Rec. 688-695). 
The matter was tried to a jury on April 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th and 9th 2002. At 
the time of trial counsel for Hatch submitted specific jury instructions outlining the necessary 
3In a previous lawsuit Hatch v. Town of Boulder, App.Case.No. 20000189-CA, Judge 
Mower had found Hatch in bad faith awarding attorneys fees against Hatch, which was 
overturned by this Court, then after remand failed to enter an order for Hatch's costs on appeal. 
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elements of his claims and defenses available to Hatch on the Counterclaims. (Rec. 676-695)4 
Hatch's Jury Instruction for Malicious Prosecution, contained the 3 elements, including the 
termination of the proceeding in favor of the accused. (Rec. 679, File 4). Hatch's Jury 
Instruction for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress included the "presence" 
requirement when the conduct is directed to a third person (Rec. 681, File 4), and Utah's 
Four Year Statute of Limitations period for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. 
(Rec. 695, File 4). 
At trial, witness Lynne Mitchell, testified that she was at the Town Meeting 
and she saw Davis offensively touch Hatch at the meeting, "Larry (Davis) came over to him 
(Hatch), pushed him against some desks, bellied up to him." "He bellied right up to him and 
backed him into the - - into the desks." (Trans. Vol. 1. pg. I l l ) She further testified that 
Ms. Davis had to come and wedge herself between Larry (Davis) and Julian (Hatch) at 
which point Julian was able to get away; and that Larry continued to follow Julian and that 
she had to step in between the two of them to keep Davis from following Hatch. She further 
testified that Davis continued to provoke them after the meeting. She also filed a letter with 
the police regarding the incident. (Trans. Vol. 1. pg. 112-113). 
Hatch testified at trial that a few years before the Town Meeting, he had been 
physically accosted by Davis when he reached into Hatch's vehicle, grabbed Hatch by the 
shoulder and began to shake him and told him "I'm going to get you." (Trans. Vol. II. pg. 
4Pages 670-699 are repeated twice in the Record. The jury instructions are located, as 
the second set, in File 4 of the Record. 
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420, 421). At the Town Meeting Hatch testified that Davis "pushed into me with his belly -
- did not push with his hands - - he just came and bellied up to me." (Trans. Vol. II. pg 
434). Hatch testified that he was pushed up against the back of some desks and pinned, "No, 
I could not move at all. I could have pushed my way out, I guess. I was against the desks 
on my back." (Trans. Vol. II. pg. 435). Hatch further testified that his life was threatened 
when Davis said "You're dead." (Trans. Vol. II. pg. 435). Hatch, is not a violent person, 
and was concerned for his safety, based on his past experiences with Davis and Davis's 
training at POST as a police officer. (Trans. Vol. II. pg 435). 
The Police Report of Monte Luker was also admitted into evidence at the trial. 
(Plaintiff's Ex.80) It contained statements from Hatch that he was pushed; and statements 
from other witnesses that Davis was 2-3 inches from Hatch's face, and that Davis's 
statements were very threatening and his demeanor was extremely confrontational, hostile 
and intimidating; and Davis beckoned Hatch to come over and fight. (Plaintiff's Ex. 80). 
At the end of Hatch's evidence Davis moved for dismissal, which was denied 
by the court.(Rec. 719) The court found, that there was a factual issue presented on the 
assault and battery claims, sufficient to go to the jury. (Trans. Vol. II, pg 540-542, 712). 
During Davis's case, Davis testified that he was the manager of Anazasi State 
Park near Boulder, Utah. As manager had lengthy discussions with Hatch regarding an 
Indian burial display. (Trans. Vol. II, pg 600). Davis told Hatch that he would remove the 
display at the Park. (Trans. Vol. II, pg 601). The display was not removed. Hatch raised 
other complaints about the Park. Hatch wrote as an officer of the Boulder Regional Group, 
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Davis personalized the matter by writing back to Hatch as an individual. Davis further 
invited Hatch to write with his complaints, stating "we can't fix what we don't know about." 
(Trans. Vol. I, pg. 253) Davis was aware that Hatch met with Director Miller in Salt Lake 
in 1990 (Trans. Vol .1, pg. 259) Davis did not remember a specific call from Director Miller 
(Trans. Vol. I, pg. 260) Davis stipulated that the burial issue was a legitimate concern. 
(Trans. Vol. I, pg. 270) Davis testified that a letter was written by Hatch claiming that Davis 
was rude and acted in an "unprofessional manner, lost his temper, swearing, pounding his 
fists, yelling." Davis admitted that he got angry with Hatch, and that dealing with Hatch was 
frustrating.(Trans. Vol. II. pg 606) Davis admitted that he lost his cool with Hatch and 
apologized to the Division. (Trans. Vol. II, pg. 620) Davis testified that he was concerned 
about his employment at that time, because Hatch went up the chain of command with his 
complaints about the Park (Trans. Vol. II, pg. 621), but Davis also testified that he referred 
Hatch to Mr. Dyckman (Trans. Vol I, pg. 273-274); and that Hatch had the right to write 
letters to his supervisors. (Trans. Vol. II, pg. 651); and that he had an opportunity to 
respond to all the questions posed by Hatch. (Trans. Vol. II, pg. 608-609) Davis's job at 
the Park was never in jeopardy as a result of any letters or actions taken by Hatch. (Trans. 
Vol. II, pg. 650-651). Davis testified to this, and his employment filed did not mention 
Hatch at all.5 
5Judge Mclff and counsel for both parties reviewed Davis's employment file and no one 
could find any mention of Hatch, his letters or his complaints. 
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Davis admitted, that at the Town Meeting, he was the one who got up out of 
his seat and came over to Hatch, and confronted him, at least saying "if you have something 
to say to me, you ought to be man enough to say it to my face" (Trans. Vol. II, pg. 631-
632). Davis denied he said "your dead," and claims that he remained at arms length, without 
touching Hatch. (Trans. Vol. II, pg. 633). The issue at the Town Meeting was about the 
legality of the Town's building inspection program, Hatch wanted to eliminate it and Davis 
wanted to keep it. (Trans. Vol. I, pg. 343). Other people in town raised the same issues. 
(Trans. Vol. I, pg. 306) Hatch was being denied building permits, by Davis's friend Randy 
Catmull (Trans. Vol. I, pg. 298). 
Davis did not suffer any actual damages on his Counterclaims only emotional 
distress, from headaches, sometimes an upset stomach, and occasional insomnia. (Trans. 
Vol. II, pg. 652). Davis also presented testimony by an expert witness regarding his 
emotional distress, which contained reports and other facts not contained in Davis's 
deposition. These reports were never disclosed to Hatch's counsel as ordered by the court 
at the Pre-Trial Conference. These reports also contained interviews conducted in February, 
a month before trial after the discovery period had expired. Hatch's counsel objected to this 
testimony, as this information was not provided as ordered by the court at the Pre-Trial 
Conference. The court denied the objections. (Rec. 719). 
The court also allowed testimony regarding Hatch's dealings with Davis's wife, 
Judith Davis, who was the Town Clerk for Boulder. These dealings were out of Mr. Davis's 
presence and had nothing to do with Mr. Davis, but Hatch's dealings with the Town of 
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Boulder. Under the Town's ordinances, it was the Clerk's responsibility to issue the 
licenses Hatch was requesting. (Trans. Vol. II, pg. 624-626) Hatch had already prevailed 
on these issues in the federal court action. (Rec. 397-398). Furthermore, at trial counsel for 
Davis stipulated that Judith Davis made mistakes as the Town Clerk. (Trans. Vol. I, pg. 
326). It was Hatch's dealings with Mr. Davis's wife, out of his presence, which was the 
basis for his emotional distress claim. (Trans. Vol. II, pg 654). 
At the end of Davis's evidence, Hatch again sought the dismissal of the 
Counterclaims as the evidence was insufficient to support the claims. Furthermore, the court 
had already found, at the end of Hatch's case-in-chief, that there was a sufficient basis to find 
probable cause on Hatch's assault and battery claims to go to the jury. Therefore bringing 
the assault and battery claims could not be deemed either as malicious prosecution, or an 
abuse of process by the jury, when both are based on a lack of probable cause. The court 
denied Hatch's motion stating: (Trans. Vol. II, pg 712) 
My view of the Motion is the same view I have with respect to the 
motion Mr. Bradshaw made at the conclusion of your case, when he asked that 
I dismiss the assault and battery claims. I'm satisfied that there are differing 
versions on all of these issues and that the jury is going to have to determine 
who it believes, what it believes, and that there is room within the evidence 
that has been admitted for the jury to reach either conclusion with respect 
to all claims. I find there's room for a reasonable jury to conclude that assault 
and battery, or at least assault - - battery may be a different story. But if Mr. 
Hatch is believed and Ms. Mitchell is believed, it could find both assault 
and battery. 
After four days of trial and a long weekend, on Tuesday April 9th, the court 
in chambers told counsel that he was going to dismiss the Malicious Prosecution and Abuse 
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of Process claims, based on the court's review of the file and the jury instructions. Counsel 
for Davis strenuously objected to such a dismissal and objected to any communication to the 
jury by the court that these claims were being dismissed, as this would undoubtedly weaken 
his case. Hatch's counsel insisted that the jury be told that the claims were being dismissed 
by the court. The trial court in an attempt to reach a middle ground, dismissed the Malicious 
Prosecution claim, without telling the jury, and left in the Abuse of Process claim, although 
the court did indicate, at the time, that it wasn't sure if this could even be allowed and that 
it may disallow it later, or may refuse to certify any verdict rendered on the Abuse of 
Process claim by the jury. The parties then stipulated that only attorneys fees were being 
sought as damages on the Abuse of Process claim and that the amount and propriety of 
attorneys fees would be determined at a later time. (See the second paragraph of the court's 
Post Verdict Ruling and Clarification, dated April 16, 2002, Rec. 782). 
Hatch was not allowed to give proper jury instructions regarding the 
"presence" requirement on the claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
Furthermore, evidence was allowed of conduct that occurred well beyond the four-year 
statute of limitation period, and Hatch was not allowed to give a jury instruction regarding 
the four-year statute of limitation period for the jury to consider. (Although Davis had earlier 
argued that this was a factual matter for the jury to decide in opposition to Hatch's earlier 
Motion for Summary Judgment. Rec. 483-484). 
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The jury instruction allowing Hatch to petition his government and write to 
governmental leaders, was improperly limited, so as not to include any conduct which may 
satisfy the definition of "Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress." (Rec. 746) 
The court also improperly instructed the jury on the Intentional Infliction of 
Emotional Distress and on the Abuse of Process claim (Rec. 743-746), not deciding the 
difference, or which claim applied, until after trial. (Rec. 782-794). 
After four days of trial, the jury was never informed of the court's ruling and 
the dismissal of the Malicious Prosecution claim. Hatch was prejudiced by the Malicious 
Prosecution and Abuse of Process claims being asserted against him on his claims. The jury 
found no cause of action on Hatch's Assault and Battery claim, and then found for Davis on 
his claim for Abuse of Process and awarded $75,000.00, although only $55,000.00 was ever 
presented in evidence, or claimed by Davis; and the parties had already stipulated that any 
recovery would be limited to attorneys fees, and would be later determined by the court. 
This also prejudiced Hatch. Such prejudice is evident from the jury's awarded of 
$75,000.00 without any evidence to support it. Furthermore, the jury awarded $87,000.00 
on Davis's claim of Infliction of Emotional Distress, although no actual damages were 
alleged or incurred, or any basis given for the $87,000.00 amount.6 (Rec. 750-753). 
6The amount of this award can only be based on the fact that evidence came in that Hatch 
had received an $86,000.00 award earlier against the Town in the federal lawsuit for the 
violation of his civil rights. The jury in this case was not acting on evidence, but solely 
prejudice against Hatch. 
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After trial, the court requested the parties to submit additional memoranda 
dealing with the Malicious Prosecution and Abuse of Process claims, and whether the court 
could proceed with the Abuse of Process claim after dismissing the Malicious Prosecution 
claim. The court ruled on April 16, 2002 that the Malicious Prosecution claim should not 
have gone to the jury and that this case did not present any "unusual" circumstance as 
referred by the Utah Supreme Court in Baird v. Intermountain School Fed. Credit Union, 
555 P.2d 877 (Utah 1976), contrary to the prior rulings by Judge Mower, from which Hatch 
had sought an interlocutory appeal, and that this claim should not have gone to the jury. 
(Rec. 785-787) However, the court allowed the Abuse of Process claim to remain in spite 
of the clear language by the Utah Court of Appeals in Winters v. Schulman, 979 P.2d 1218 
(Ut.App. 1999) and Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler. 768 P.2d 950 (Ut.App. 1989) stating 
that an "abuse of process claim requires that the prior proceedings have terminated in favor 
of the person against whom they were brought." 977 P.2d at 1255. The trial court found 
that Davis could proceed with his Abuse of Process claim and that prior termination was not 
required. (Rec. 789-790) However, the trial court could not allow the $75,000.00 damage 
award on the Abuse of Process claim to stand, since there was no evidence of this presented 
to the jury. (Rec. 790) The court further ruled that since there was not a single act of 
outrageous conduct, "but a practice of acts tolerable by themselves," the statute of limitations 
issue was not a legitimate issue for the jury to consider. (Rec. 798). 
On April 11, 2002, before any Judgment was rendered in the case, the trial 
court, relying on Rule 69(q) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure entered an Order 
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Precluding Plaintiffs Transfer or Encumbrance of Property with a value greater than 
$500.00. (Rec. 756-757) Counsel for Hatch was contacted by telephone and objected to 
such an order, since a judgment had not been entered, and Rule 69(q) did not provide for 
such an order against Hatch. Hatch's counsel requested personal service of the Order on 
Hatch before it became effective. This was agreed to by Davis's counsel, but the Order was 
never personally served on Hatch. Finally, after the court issued its Post Verdict Ruling and 
Clarification (Rec. 782-795), the court entered a Partial Judgment in the amount of 
$87,000.00. (Rec. 796). The Partial Judgment provides that it, "does not resolve all the 
issues raised between the parties in the suit, the time for appeal shall not commence to run 
until a final judgment is entered that fully concludes the litigation." (Rec. 796). 
On or about April 29, 2002, Hatch filed a Motion to Set Aside the Verdict on 
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (Rec. 825-833), and a Motion for New Trial; or 
in the alternative a Remittitur on the Amount of Damages. (Rec. 834-846). 
On May 14, 2002, before a final judgment was entered, the trial court issued 
a Writ of Garnishment on an exempt IRA account, which was taken (Rec. 855-857), a copy 
of the Writ was never sent to Hatch's counsel; and on July 18, 2002, the trial court further 
issued an Order in Supplemental Proceedings again before a final judgment was entered. 
This Order was also never personally served on Hatch, but a copy was sent to Hatch's 
counsel, who objected to it as being premature and filed a Motion to Quash the Order. 
Hatch also filed a Motion to Vacate the Order Precluding Plaintiff's Transfer or 
Encumbrance of Property. (Rec. 813-824). 
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On June 9, 2002, the court denied two pending motions, the Motion to Vacate 
Order and the Motion for New Trial.(914-919) On September 5, 2002, the trial court held 
an evidentiary hearing on the outstanding issues and the attorneys fees as damages on the 
Abuse of Process claim. The attorneys fees were reduced to $43,542.93 and final judgment 
was entered on September 5, 2002. (Rec. 1044-1047, 1059-1062) A Motion and Order in 
Supplemental Proceedings was issued that day. (Rec. 1065-1067) Hatch's Notice of Appeal 
was filed on September 17, 2002. (Rec. 1054-1055). 
Statement of the Facts 
1. At trial Lynne Mitchell testified that she was at the public hearing and 
that she witnessed Davis push Hatch up against some desks. She further testified that she 
had to wedge herself between Davis and Hatch, so Hatch could get away and that Davis 
continued to follow Hatch, provoking him to fight. (Trans. Vol. I. pg 111-113). 
2. Hatch testified at trial, that he had been grabbed and threatened before 
by Davis (Trans. Vol. II, pg. 420-421) and that at the public hearing Davis pushed him back 
against some desks so Hatch couldn't move, and among other things told Hatch "You're 
dead." (Trans. Vol. II, pg. 435). 
3. Hatch testified that he was in fear for his safety, as a result of Davis's 
actions at the public hearing; Davis's previous actions towards Hatch; and the fact that Davis 
had been trained in physical combat at POST as a police officer. (Trans. Vol. II, pg. 435). 
4. The Police Report of Monte Luker, admitted into evidence, also 
contains statements from Hatch that he was pushed; and statements from other witnesses 
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stating that Davis's face was 2-3 inches from Hatch's face, that Davis's statements v/ere very 
threatening and his demeanor extremely confrontational, hostile and intimidating; and that 
Davis beckoned Hatch to come over and fight. (Plaintiff's Ex. 80). 
5. Davis testified that he had lengthy discussions with Hatch in the past 
(1989-1990) about an Indian burial display. (Trans. Vol. II, pg 600). Davis told Hatch that 
the display would be removed. (Trans. Vol. II, pg 601). The display was not removed, 
when promised; and Hatch raised more questions about the Park. Davis invited Hatch to 
write with his complaints, stating "we can't fix what we don't know about." (Trans. Vol. I, 
pg. 253). 
6. Hatch raised legitimate issues in his letters, such as the adequacy of the 
facilities at the State Park to house such a burial display. (Trans. Vol. I, pg. 270). Hatch 
was referred to Davis's supervisors by Davis himself. (Trans. Vol. I, pg. 273). 
7. Davis testified that he received a call from a division director or 
someone (not sure who) wanting an explanation of what's going on." (Trans. Vol. II, pg 
603) Davis did not remember a specific call from his supervisor. (Trans. Vol. II. pg. 604). 
This occurred back in March of 1990. (Trans. Vol. II. pg. 605). 
8. Hatch did not make any threats to Davis but only questioned the 
operation of the Park and that the burial display be removed from the Park. Davis found 
Hatch to be a very demanding person. (Trans. Vol. I, pg. 257). Davis didn't immediately 
respond to Hatch because of his demanding attitude. (Trans. Vol. I, pg. 258). 
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9. Hatch wrote letters to Utah State Park directors and Governor Bangetor 
about the Indian burial display and the display, met with Director Miller in Salt Lake City, 
and the display was finally removed. This occurred back in June of 1990. (Trans. Vol. I, 
pg. 263). Davis testified that he was planning to remove the burial display anyway, 
regardless of any action from Hatch. (Trans. Vol. I, pg. 261-262, 266). 
10. At trial Davis produced letters written by Hatch, although Davis did not 
know or testify as to what was contained in each of these letters. (These letter are contained 
in a book of exhibits, identified as Defendant's Exhibit 103). A letter written by Hatch in 
March of 1990, claimed that Davis was rude and acted in an "unprofessional manner, lost 
his temper, swearing, pounding his fists, yelling." Hatch further states, "I believe that State 
Parks need to be aware of this behavior and ought to see that it does not happen to me or 
anyone else in the future. An investigation should be conducted into the policies and 
unprofessional behavior of theses [sic] persons. I would like a written apology from Supt. 
Davis concerning his derogatory and adversarial letter to me." (See Def's Ex. 103, tab 6, 
2nd page). At trial, Davis admitted that he got angry with Hatch at times, and that dealing 
with Hatch was frustrating. (Trans. Vol. II. pg 606). 
11. On April 29, 1990 a letter was written by Hatch, not to Davis, but to 
Jerry A. Miller, regarding Mr. Miller's failure to answer Hatch's questions regarding the 
Park in a competent manner. Hatch states in the letter, "I will no longer wait and expect a 
decent reply to my concerns and I hereby 'wash my hands' of you and your flunky 
employees at State Parks." Hatch further writes, "the one glaring problem is with Jerry 
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Miller, Larry Davis, and Anazasi State Park. It appears obvious to me who needs to be 
forced to obey the law and the problem will quickly be mended." The law is referring to 
the proper burial of Native American Indian remains. (Def s Ex. 103, tab 8). 
12. On March 13, 1992, a letter was written to Davis, asking seven (7) 
specific questions about the Indian burial. (Def s Ex. 103, tab 11). This was not responded 
to by Davis. On April 20, 1992, Hatch wrote a letter to Jerry Miller, not Davis, stating that 
Mr. Davis had failed to answer his questions and that Davis still continues to fight respectful 
actions towards the Anazasi Human remains and material goods, with which he has been 
entrusted. It appears by this hostile reply that Mr. Davis is not desirous of reinterment [sic] 
but is not courageous enough to say so." Finally Hatch concludes his letter stating, "Mr. 
Davis is not the correct person to lead Anasazi State Park in efforts to deal with the public 
in an equitable and considerate way. He appears to be too emotionally attached to the old 
Anazasi St. Pk. After twenty something years. We need someone to replace Mr. Davis and 
stop the continued abuses and problems which plague Anazasi Park." (Def s Ex. 103, tab 
13). 
13. Julian also wrote of the incident in front of the Post Office on June 2, 
1992, when he was physically accosted by Mr. Davis. (Def s Ex. 103, tab 16) At trial, 
Davis admitted that he lost his cool with Hatch, at this time; and apologized to the Division 
for the incident. (Trans. Vol. II, pg. 620). 
14. The next letter from Hatch was not to Davis, but to Governor Bangerter 
in June of 1992. Hatch in this letter asked for an investigation into the Division of State 
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Parks due to problems with Park Manager Larry Davis and Director Jerry Miller. (Def s 
Ex. 103, tab 19). 
15. The letters after this were not sent to Davis, but to Steven Roberts, 
regarding the free, or preferential, use of the Park by Boulder Outdoor Survival School 
("BOSS"), owned by personal friends of Davis. (Def s Ex. 103, tab 27). As far as Mr. 
Davis, the letter states, "until my complaints about BOSS occupying space at the park were 
made to Park Manager Larry Davis on March 8, 1990, after his request in writing for me 
to do so, the Division of Sate [sic] Parks didn't even have a lease contract with BOSS. 
Evidently, Mr. Davis quickly got a lease beginning May 1,1990 but for many years the law 
was broken because he just let them move their trailers and personnel onto the park without 
any contract. The Free-ride for Mr. Davis's personal friends must end and I ask that you 
suspend and end this lease on April 30, 1993." (Def's Ex. 103, tab 27). The following 
letters simply sought information regarding BOSS'S operation on the Park. (Def's Ex. 103, 
tabs 29,30,32). 
16. At trial Davis testified that his job was never threatened by any letter 
or complaint from Hatch. He testified that he was concerned about his employment, but 
only because Hatch went up the chain of command with his complaints about the Park. 
(Trans. Vol. II, pg. 621). However, Davis also testified that Hatch had the right to write 
letters to his supervisors regarding legitimate issues at the Park (Trans. Vol. II, pg. 651); and 
that he (Mr. Davis) had an opportunity to respond to all the issues raised by Hatch. (Trans. 
Vol. II, pg. 608-609). 
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17. Davis's job at the Park was never in jeopardy as a result of any letters 
or actions taken by Hatch. (Trans. Vol. II, pg. 650-651). Davis never received any letter, 
or notice, or any indication that his job was put in jeopardy as a result of any letter or action 
taken by Hatch. (Trans. Vol. II, pg. 650-651) 
18. As Davis testified the letters do not say that Davis should be fired from 
the Park Service or that he is corrupt, but that "an investigation should be conducted into the 
policies and unprofessional behavior of these persons." (Trans. Vol. II, pg. 607, 619). 
Davis testified, that as a result of these letters, he had to answer questions and respond to 
phone calls. This started in 1990, and lasted between 1990 and 1992. (Trans. Vol. II, pg. 
607, 651). 
19. Davis admitted, that at the public hearing, he was the one who got up 
walked over to Hatch and confronted him, and at least said to Hatch "if you have something 
to say to me, you ought to be man enough to say it to my face" (Trans. Vol. II, pg. 631-
632). Davis denied he said "your dead," and he claimed that he remained at arms length, 
without touching Hatch. (Trans. Vol. II, pg. 633). 
20. The building inspector, Randy Catmull, was a friend of Davis, and 
Davis felt as though the town was feeding on him like a bunch of hungry sharks, (Trans. 
Vol. I, pg. 300) and that by voting to eliminate the building inspection program the Town 
was letting "Julian win again." Davis was also upset with Hatch over the issue of Town 
prayer. (Trans. Vol. I, pg. 299, 302; letter to Joel Greer, Pit's Ex. 56). 
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21. Davis did not testify of any conduct taken by Hatch against his wife, 
Judith Davis, while in his presence. Davis simply testified that he eventually learned that 
Hatch asked for an investigation into her services as postmistress. (Trans. Vol. II, pg. 624). 
22. As far as emotional distress, Davis testified that he has thought about 
Hatch over the past 11-12 years and his life has been less enjoyable. (Trans. Vol. II, pg. 
636-637). He sometimes gets upset stomachs, headaches, and wakes up at night; however 
he never saw a health care professional regarding his symptoms. (Trans. Vol. II, pg. 653-
655). These symptoms appeared right after the incidents occurred in the early 90s. (Trans. 
Vol. I, pg.352). 
23. Judith Davis testified that she couldn't think of anything outrageous or 
intolerable that was done against her by Hatch and she has never been fearful of Hatch. 
(Trans. Vol. I, pg. 340-341). Although Mr. Davis claims emotional distress through his 
wife, Judith Davis, she did not bring any claims against Hatch for Infliction of Emotional 
Distress or any other claims asserted in Davis's Counterclaim. (Trans. Vol. I, pg. 340-341). 
Judith Davis testified that she has not seen any letters written by Hatch accusing her of any 
malfeasance, and she doesn't know of any action taken against her as a result of any 
complaints made by Hatch. (Trans. Vol. I, pg 354). 
24. Judith Davis also testified that Hatch's effect on Davis was high blood 
pressure, indigestion, and inability to concentrate at times. Davis did not seek any help or 
medicine for these symptoms. (Trans. Vol. I, pg. 344). She also testified that Davis had 
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a history of high blood pressure, and high cholesterol, and had an operation on his heart in 
1997, as well as, having his knees replaced in 1994. (Trans. Vol. I, pg. 346). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The court should have dismissed Davis's Counterclaim for Malicious 
Prosecution on Hatch's Motion to Dismiss, due to the fact that the initial proceeding against 
Davis had not been terminated in Davis's favor. Baird v. Intermountain School Federal 
C.U.. 555 P.2d 877, 878 (Utah 1976); Giles v. Hill Lewis Marce. 988 P.2d 143 (Az.App. 
1999); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 674(B) (1977). 
Abuse of process also requires that the prior proceedings be terminated in favor 
of the person against whom they were brought. Winters v. Shulman, 979 P.2d 1218 (Ut. 
App. 1999); Arnica Mutal Ins. Co. v. Schettler. 768 P.2d (Ut. App. 1989). Furthermore, 
the Abuse of Process claim is based on a lack of probable cause (without hope of success), 
and when an allegation of abuse of process is made based on such a claim, the "same sound 
judicial policy which requires termination of prior litigation for malicious prosecution, would 
seem to require a termination of the proceedings before an abuse of process claim. Friedman 
v. RosethCorp.. 75 N.Y.S.2d 515; Terry v. Wonder Seal Co.. 170 S.E.2d 745 (Ga.App. 
1969). 
Moreover, contrary to the allegations made by Davis, abuse of process does 
not exist simply because the claims asserted are not true, even if they are asserted in bad 
faith. Crease v. Pleasant Grove City, 519 P.2d 888 (Utah 1974). Abuse of process requires 
two elements: (1) an ulterior motive; and (2) a willful act in use of the process not proper 
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in the regular conduct of the proceedings. Giles v. Hill Lewis Marce, 988 P.2d 143 
(Az.App. 1999). These two elements were not alleged by Davis in his Counterclaim, were 
not established at trial, and the jury was never properly instructed on both elements, only the 
first element, ulterior motive. (Rec. 744). 
The second element for abuse of process, a willful act in use of the process not 
proper in the regular course of the proceedings, requires an overt act, done in addition to 
filing and maintaining a lawsuit. 
v. Koniag. Inc., 31 P.2 77 (Alaska 2001). There was no willful or overt act alleged by 
Davis or committed by Hatch, which was not proper in the regular course of the 
proceedings. Furthermore, an improper act may not be inferred from an improper motive 
alone; if the act itself is still regular, the motive, ulterior or otherwise, is immaterial.7 Bosler 
v. Shuck. 714 P.2d 1231 (Wyo. 1986). 
The Abuse of Process claim also fails as a matter of law and should have been 
dismissed after the court's ruling, at the end of Hatch's case-in-chief, when the court found 
as matter of law that Hatch met his prima facie burden on the facts and elements of his 
claims sufficient to go to a jury. This finding destroys any claim that Davis may have had 
for abuse of process. Westar Mortgage Corp. v. Jackson. 61 P.3d 823 (N.M. 2002) 
(existence of probable cause in proceeding underlying claim for abuse of process is question 
of law). 
7This is directly contrary to the Instruction given to the jury in this case, which lists the 
ulterior motive, as the one essential element for Abuse of Process. (Rec. 744) 
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To recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the claimant must 
show, among other things, that the conduct was outrageous and intolerable, in that it is 
offensive against the generally accepted standards of decency and morality; and that the 
claimant actually suffered emotional distress. Samms v. Eccles, 358 P.2d 344,346-47 (Utah 
1961). Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, 
and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded 
as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." 
of Grimm, 784 P.2d 1238,1246 (Ut.App. 1989). 
The evidence in this case, marshaled in favor of Davis, i.e., that Hatch wrote 
letters to Davis's supervisors complaining about the Indian burial display and other 
operations at the State Park; and complained about his treatment from Davis, as being 
unresponsive and unprofessional; complaining that there needs to be an investigation of the 
Park; and that Davis is not the correct person to manage the Park; is not sufficient to rise to 
the level of extreme and outrageous conduct for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
Furthermore, Utah's four (4) year limitation period applies to any claim for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, § 78-12-25(3), U.C.A. (1953, as amended). 
Retherford, supra, at 975; and Davis's claims are based on actions which occurred in the 
early 1990s, well beyond the four (4) year limitation period. These letters should have been 
excluded, or at a minimum, the jury should have been instructed regarding the limitation 
period. Particularly when the alleged symptoms appeared in the early 1990s. (Trans. Vol. 
I, Pg. 352). 
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Moreover, Davis never suffered severe emotional distress. He only testified 
of an occasional up set stomach, headaches, and sometimes insomnia. He never sought 
professional help for these symptoms. The expert that testified based her information on an 
interview with Davis in February 2002, approximately 30 days before trial, 10 years after 
the symptoms occurred and after the discovery deadline. This expert also failed to provide 
a copy of her report to Hatch's counsel or appear at her deposition as ordered by the court 
at the Pre-trial Conference. Her testimony should have been excluded altogether. 
Davis's claim for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress is based on 
Hatch's dealings with his wife, Judith Davis, as Boulder Town Clerk. However, where the 
conduct is directed towards a third person, the actor is only subject to liability of a family 
member who is present at the time. Restatement (Second) Of Torts § 46(b)(2); Samms v. 
Eccles, 358 P.2d 344 (Utah 1961); Lund v. Caple. 675 P.2d 226 (Wash. 1984). Hatch 
cannot be found liable for such conduct in this case, when Mr. Davis was not present. 
In addition, Davis's Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress claim against 
Hatch is prohibited by the First Amendment, which specifically provides citizens the right 
to petition their government, and to be critical of public officials. Therefore, as a citizen, 
Hatch had a constitutional right to voice his grievances to state officials and to be critical of 
Davis's official duties at the Park. Garrison v. State of La., 379 U.S. 64 (1964)(where 
criticism is of a public official and their conduct of public business, the interest in private 
reputation is overborne by the larger public interest, secured by the First Amendment, in the 
dissemination of truth). Furthermore, before Davis can prevail against Hatch, he must show 
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by clear and convincing evidence, that Hatch published false statements of fact, with "actual 
malice." Hustler Magazine v. FalwelL 485 U.S. 46,108 S.Ct. 876, 99 L.Ed.3d 41 (1988); 
Margoles v. Habbart 760 P.2d 324 (Wash. 1988) (clear and convincing proof of actual 
malice is required for a public official, this cannot be established solely by evidence of 
personal hostility, vindictiveness or spite). These required elements were never alleged by 
Davis in his Counterclaim or established at trial. 
The trial court also improperly issued supplemental orders and writs of 
execution before there was a final judgment entered. D'Ash ton v. Aston, 844 P.2d 345,349 
(Ut.App. 1992); 
v. Williams, 993 P.2d 1911 (Utah 1999). A judgment which does not adjudicate all the 
claims between the parties is not a final judgment and cannot support the issuance of an 
execution. CIT Financial Services v. Erbs Indoor RV Center, 702 P.2d 858 (Id.App. 1985). 
The trial court should not have issued writs of execution on the Partial Judgment, which 
specifically reserved issues for further determination. 
Finally, Rule 69(q) does not provide for a prejudgment order precluding the 
transfer of any property before a judgment is entered, as the April 11,2002 Order does. The 
proper procedure to follow would have been under Rule 64A, governing prejudgment 
attachments and garnishments, which was never followed. Furthermore, the April 11,2002 
Order is in violation of Utah's Exemption's Act § 78-23-1 et. seq., as it restricts even the 
transfer of property that is exempt from execution and does not provide the opportunity to 
request a hearing. The April 11, 2002 Order, was also never personally served on Hatch; 
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and Rule 69 requires personal service along with notice to the judgment debtor of a right to 
a hearing. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DISMISS 
THE MALICIOUS PROSECUTION CLAIM. 
A. Before an action can be brought for malicious 
prosecution, the underlying action must first be 
terminated in favor of the accused. 
The law is clear that an action cannot be brought for malicious prosecution in 
a civil matter until after the underlying action is first terminated in favor of the accused and 
the civil suit was brought without probable cause for the purpose of harassment. Davis's 
claim for Malicious Prosecution should have been dismissed at the start, due to the fact that 
the underlying action was not first terminated in Davis's favor. Baird v. Intermountain 
School Federal C.U.. 555 P.2d 877, 878 (Utah 1976); Giles v. Hill Lewis Marce. 988 P.2d 
143 (Az.App. 1999) Restatement (Second) Of Torts § 674(B) (1977). 
B. The trial court erred in failing to inform the Jury of the 
dismissal of the Malicious Prosecution Claim. 
After 4 days of trail and evidence, the court decided to dismiss the Malicious 
Prosecution and Abuse of Process claims, since all of the elements had not been satisfied, 
and the underlying proceeding had not been decided in Davis's favor based on a lack of 
probable cause. The court then decided to dismiss just the Malicious Prosecution claim, 
although both claims were based on the filing of the lawsuit without probable cause or hope 
of success. 
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After dismissing the Malicious Prosecution claim, the court failed to inform 
the jury that this claim was being dismissed and the reasons for the dismissal, i.e., that in 
order to find Malicious Prosecution, the case must first be decided in favor of the accused 
based on a lack of probable cause. This prejudiced Hatch because throughout trial Davis had 
combined the two claims and maintained that the claims against him were filed without any 
hope of success or probable cause. It was not until after trial and the verdict was rendered, 
that the trial court attempted to distinguish between the two claims for relief, reclassified 
Davis's Abuse of Process claim, and tried to find the necessary elements for the Abuse of 
Process claim. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
DISMISS THE ABUSE OF PROCESS CLAIM. 
A. An Abuse of Process Claim was never properly alleged. 
Davis's Counterclaim for Abuse of Process was based on the re-filing of the 
Complaint against him, which he claims was without any hope of success and for an 
improper purpose; that is, to intimidate the residents of the town council to comply with Mr. 
Hatch's narrow and peculiar political and philosophical positions. (Rec. 62). 
The essential elements for abuse of process are (1) an ulterior motive; and (2) 
a willful act in use of the process not proper in the regular conduct of the proceedings. Giles 
v.Hill Lewis Marce. 988 P.2d 143 (Az.App. 1999); Executive Mgt. Ltd. v. Ticor Title Ins. 
Co.. 963 P.2d 464 (N.M. 1998). 
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Therefore, Davis's claim for Abuse of Process does not state an essential 
element, i.e., that there was a willful act in use of the judicial process not proper in the 
regular course of the proceedings. Giles v. Hill Lewis Marce, 988 P.2d 143 (Az.App. 
1999). There was no evidence presented, that Hatch used any process not proper in the 
regular course of the proceedings. Davis's claim against Hatch based on the malicious filing 
of the case should have been dismissed. 
As set forth above, the Abuse of Process claim asserted against Hatch in this 
case does not allege that any action was taken in the course of the proceeding which was not 
proper in the regular course of the proceeding. It only alleges that the action was maliciously 
filed for an improper motive; therefore, the action is essentially the same as the Malicious 
Prosecution action and should have been dismissed along with the Malicious Prosecution 
claim. It is the allegations in the claim that should be determinative and not the title used or 
given to the claim. Even if it is not the same, it contains similar allegations, that the case 
was improperly filed and therefore the same sound judicial policy which requires termination 
of prior litigation for malicious prosecution should apply to the Abuse of Process claim in 
this case. Friedman v. Roseth Corp. 75 N.Y.S.2d 515; Terry v. Wonder Seal Co.. 170 
S.E.2d 745 (Ga.App. 1969). 
B. The jury was not properly instructed on the 
Abuse of Process Claim. 
As stated above abuse of process requires two elements: (1) an ulterior motive; 
and (2) a willful act in use of the process not proper in the regular conduct of the 
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proceedings. Giles v. Hill Lewis Marce. 988 P.2d 143 (Az.App. 1999); Executive Mgt. 
Ltd. v. Ticor Title Ins. Co.. 963 P.2d 464 (N.M. 1998). These two elements were not 
established and the jury was never properly instructed on these two elements, the jury was 
only instructed on one element, ulterior motive. (Rec. 744). 
The court never dealt with the second element for abuse of process. For 
instance, there was no willful act by Hatch in use of the process not proper in the regular 
conduct of the proceedings. The court made no finding in this regard, other than Hatch did 
not prevail on his claims at trial. There was no misuse of discovery, no improper seizure 
of property, no arrest, no criminal proceedings initiated, none of the uses generally found 
in an abuse of process case. The fact that Hatch did not ultimately prevail, does not by itself 
constitute an "improper use of the process," Crease, supra. 
A willful act under the abuse of process claim requires an overt act done in 
addition to the initiating of the suit; thus, the mere filing of the lawsuit, even for an 
improper purpose, is not a proper basis for an abuse of process claim. Meidinger v. Koniag. 
Inc.. 31 P.2 77 (Alaska 2001); Caudle v. Mendel. 994 P.2d 372 (Alaska 1999); DeVaney 
v. Thriftwav Marketing Corp.. 953 P.2d 277 (N.M. 1997) cert, denied 524 U.S. 915 (must 
be act that is irregular or improper in the normal course of the proceedings). There was no 
evidence of any overt action taken by Hatch in the course of the proceedings to constitute 
abuse of process. This over act must be utilizing the judicial procedure for purposes so 
lacking in justification, as to lose any legitimate function, as a reasonably justifiable litigation 
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procedure. Giles v. Hill Marce, 988 P.2d 143 (Arz.App. 1990). There were no overt acts 
alleged in this case or evidence of any overt acts presented to the jury. 
Moreover, improper acts may not be inferred from an improper motive alone; 
if the act itself is still regular, the motive ulterior or otherwise is immaterial. Bosler v. 
Shuck, 714 P.2d 1231 (Wyo. 1986). This is directly contrary to the jury instruction which 
was given regarding Abuse of Process in this case, stating that the ulterior motive or purpose 
was the only one essential element for an abuse of process claim. (Rec. 744). 
C. It was improper for the trial court to reclassify the 
Abuse of Process claim after the trial was over. 
As stated above, abuse of process does not exist simply because the claims 
asserted are not true, or even if they are asserted in bad faith. Crease v. Pleasant Grove 
City, 519 P.2d 888 (Utah 1974). Abuse of process requires two elements: (1) an ulterior 
motive; and (2) a willful act in use of the process not proper in the regular conduct of the 
proceedings. Giles v. Hill Lewis Marce, 988 P.2d 143 (Az.App. 1999); Executive Mgt. 
Ltd. v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 963 P.2d 464 (N.M. 1998). These two elements were not 
alleged and were not established at trial, and the jury was not properly instructed on these 
two elements, the jury was only instructed on one element, the ulterior motive. (Rec. 744). 
Since the court never dealt with the second element for abuse of process and 
the court made no finding in this regard, i.e. no misuse of discovery, no improper seizure 
of property, no arrest, no criminal proceedings initiated, none of the uses generally found 
in an abuse of process case. The fact that Hatch did not ultimately prevail, does not by itself 
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constitute an "improper use of the process/' Crease, supra. There is no evidence of any 
affirmative act manifesting a perversion of the process. Id. 
It was improper for the court, after trial, to go back and try to reclassify 
Davis's claim as a claim for Abuse of Process, when the necessary elements were never 
alleged and the jury was never properly instructed on an Abuse of Process claim. 
D. The Abuse of Process claim cannot be based 
on the re-filing under Utah's Saving Statute. 
As stated above, the second element for Abuse of Process requires the use of 
the process in a manner not proper in the regular course of the proceeding. The re-filing of 
the lawsuit against Davis in State court, after it was dismissed from federal court based on 
jurisdictional grounds was allowed under Utah's Saving Statute and ruled as timely by the 
court. Therefore, this re-filing of the complaint cannot stand as an abuse of process. 
First, the filing of an action alone does not constitute an abuse of process. 
There must be something more than the mere institution of legal proceedings, even if 
frivolous, to constitute an act of abuse of process. Crease v. Pleasant Grove City, 519 P.2d 
888 (Utah 1974). There must be some use of the process outside the regular course of the 
proceedings to constitute abuse of process. Giles v. Hill Lewis Marce, 988 P.2d 143 
(Az.App. 1999); Executive Mgt. Ltd. v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 963 P.2d 464 (N.M. 1988). 
Hatch's filing of the Complaint alone cannot constitute an abuse of process, even if Hatch 
did not prevail, and even if the action was frivolous. Crease, supra. Furthermore, in this 
case the court found that the re-filing was timely and allowed under Utah's Savings Statute. 
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The court previously ruled that the re-filing of the Complaint after it was 
previously dismissed from the federal court for lack of jurisdiction was allowed under Utah's 
Savings Statute. The court should not be allowed to rule that this pleading is allowed under 
the law, and then allow the jury to determine if it was an abuse of the process. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DISMISS 
THE CLAIMS FOR ABUSE OF PROCESS AND 
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION AFTER THE COURT 
FOUND PROBABLE CAUSE AT THE END OF 
HATCH'S CASE IN CHIEF. 
The existence of probable cause in a proceeding underlying a claim for abuse 
of process is a question of law for the court. Westar Mortgage Corp. v. Jackson, 61 P.3d 
823 (N.M. 2002). Even if facts are in dispute, the role of the jury is only to determine the 
facts bearing on the probable cause question; however, whether those facts constitute 
probable cause remains a matter for the court to decide. Id. 
At the end of Hatch's case-in-chief, the trail court found sufficient probable 
cause on Hatch's claims to go to the jury. Specifically, "that there is room within the 
evidence that has been admitted for the jury to reach either conclusion with respect to 
all claims," that, if Mr. Hatch is believed and Ms. Mitchell is believed, it could find both 
assault and battery." (Trans. Vol, II, pg 712). 
Therefore, since the court found sufficient probable cause to present the issue 
to the jury on both the assault and the battery claims. Hatch's claims cannot be frivolous, 
without probable cause, and there can be no abuse of process for bringing these claims 
without probable cause. Westar Mortgage Corp. v. Jackson, 61 P.3d 823 (N.M. 2002)(fact 
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that plaintiff is bound over for trial constitutes prima facie evidence of probable cause and 
is fatal to claim of abuse of process) The court at this time should have dismissed Davis's 
claims for Malicious Prosecution and Abuse of Process. 
IV. THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DISMISS THE 
CLAIM FOR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF 
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS. 
A. The evidence when marshaled is insufficient to 
establish any "extreme & outrageous" conduct for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
For intentional infliction of emotional distress, the claimant must show (1) that 
the other party's conduct was directed toward the claimant; (2) that the conduct was 
outrageous and intolerable, in that it is offensive against the generally accepted standards of 
decency and morality (must show that a reasonable person would consider the alleged 
conduct to be outrageous under an objective standard); (3) that the party intended to cause, 
or acted in reckless disregard of the likelihood of causing, emotional distress; (4) that the 
claimant actually suffered emotional distress (must show that the claimant actually 
experienced subjective severe emotional anguish because of the objectively outrageous 
conduct); and (5) that said outrageous conduct proximately caused claimant's emotional 
distress. Samms v. Eccles, 358 P.2d 344, 346-47 (Utah 1961). The conduct must evoke 
outrage or revulsion, it must be more than unreasonable, unkind, or unfair; and furthermore, 
an act is not necessarily outrageous merely because it is tortious, injurious, or malicious, or 
because it would give rise to punitive damages or because it is illegal. Franco v. The Church 
of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints. 21 P.3d 198 (Utah 2001). 
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Whether conduct is sufficiently outrageous to allow recovery is ordinarily a 
jury question, but initially it is the court's responsibility to determine if reasonable minds 
could differ on whether the conduct was so extreme as to result in liability. Keates v. City 
of Vancouver. 869 P.2d 88 (Wash.App.Div.2 1994). 
The evidence regarding the issue of extreme and outrageous conduct, 
marshaled in favor of Davis, is specifically set forth in the above Statement of Facts, 
paragraphs 5 through 24, which include the letters written by Hatch, contained in 
Defendant's Exhibit 103. Hatch wrote letters, upon Davis's invitation, to Davis's 
supervisors, which was Hatch's right, complaining about the Indian burial display and other 
operations at the Park, which were legitimate issues. Hatch complained about his treatment 
from Davis, as being unresponsive and unprofessional. Hatch requested an investigation of 
the matters and the policies at the Park and stated that Davis may not be the right person to 
continue to manage the Park. However, according to Davis's own testimony, Hatch's 
complaints never put Davis's job in jeopardy; and Davis never received any indication that 
his job was in jeopardy, although he did claim that it was a concern to him. This evidence, 
even when marshaled in Davis's favor, is still insufficient to show the necessary extreme and 
outrageous conduct. 
The actions of Hatch in writing letters to Davis and his supervisors, who are 
government official, and asking questions about the policies at the state Park and complaining 
about the way Davis ran the Park and treated Hatch, and even asking for an investigation and 
stating that Davis needs to be replaced as Park manager; do not rise to the level necessary 
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to constitute "extreme and outrageous" conduct. This conduct has not been considered 
atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Mere insults especially in context 
of political disputes, do not exceed bounds of decency. Andrews v. Stallings, 8982 P.2d 611 
(N.M.App. 1995); Snyder v. Medical Services Corp. of Eastern Washington, 985 P.2d 1023 
(Wash.App.Div.3 1999)(insults, threats, and annoying employee, does not rise to necessary 
level); Garcia v.Lawson, 928 P.2d 1164 (Wyo. 1996)(no claim for bad taste, boorishness, 
condescension, obnoxiousness or social ineptitude); Keates v. City of Vancouver, 869 P.2d 
88 (Wash.App.Div.2 1994)(police officer yelling at husband suspected of murdering wife, 
was not outrageous, even though officer yelled into husband's face about murdering his wife, 
was insulting to husband and unbecoming to officer); and Breeden v. League Services Corp., 
575 P.2d 1374 (Okla. 1978)(where collection company sent letters to debtor's home, to her 
work, made several attempts to contact her by phone, both at home and at work, totaling 16 
attempts, and in one call called her a God damned liar and deadbeat, collection company's 
conduct was not outrageous). 
Even if Hatch's accusations were all false; and Davis was terminated from his 
job as a result; this would not be sufficient to constitute extreme and outrageous conduct. 
Sperber v. Galigher Ash Co., 747 P.2d 1025 (Utah 1987)(mere discharge from employment 
does not rise to level of outrageous or intolerable conduct, even if based on false reasons); 
Dubois v.Grand Central, 872 P.2d 1073 (Ut.App. 1994); Robertson v. Utah Fuel Co., 889 
P.2d 1382 (Ut.App. 1995) cert, denied (discharge from employment not intolerable even if 
employee is required to discuss drug addiction). 
42 
B. Davis's claim for emotional distress based on actions 
that occurred in the early 1990s is barred by Utah's 
four (4) year statute of limitations. 
Utah's four (4) year limitation period applies to intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. § 78-12-25(3), U.C.A. (1953, as amended). Retherford, supra, at 975. 
The statute of limitations begins to run when the cause of action accrues. §78-12-1 U.C.A. 
(1953, as amended); 
Lumber Sales. Inc. v. Bonneville Inv., Inc., 794 P.2d 11, 19 (Utah 1990). Davis made 
claims for actions which occurred in early 1989 and 1990, much more than four (4) years 
beyond the limitation period. The letters were written between 1990 and 1993, well beyond 
the limitation period. Any claim for damages at this time should have been dismissed and 
this evidence should have been excluded. 
C. A jury instruction should have been given regarding 
Utah's four (4) year statute of limitations for infliction 
of emotional distress. 
As set forth above, the claims of Davis that occurred beyond the 4 year 
limitation period should have been barred and this evidence excluded at trial. If not 
excluded, at a minimum, the jury should have been instructed regarding the 4 year limitation 
period and that Davis cannot recover for his damages beyond this period. Davis previously 
argued, in opposition to Hatch's Motion for Summary Judgment, that this was a factual issue 
and a question for the jury. In addition, Davis testified at trial that he suffered his emotional 
distress at the time of each incident, in the early 1990s; and the court in its Post-Verdict 
ruling found that there was no single incident that constituted extreme and outrageous 
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conduct. This jury should have decided when Davis first suffered his alleged damages, and 
if it was beyond the time period allowed by the statute of limitations. 
D. There is a "presence requirement" necessary for 
infliction of emotional distress for actions directed 
to another party. 
Davis claims intentional infliction of emotional distress as a result of Hatch's 
dealings with his wife, Judith Davis, as the Boulder Town Clerk. However, for a person to 
recover for such emotional distress that person must be present at the time. Restatement 
(Second) Of Torts § 46(b)(2); Samms v. Eccles. 358 P.2d 344 (Utah 1961); Lund v. Caple. 
675 P.2d 226 (Wash. 1984)(husband who was not present when alleged outrageous conduct 
by pastor with husband's wife occurred, including sexual relations; did not establish 
necessary elements of tort directed to a third person); Lien v. Barnett, 794 P.2d 865 
(Wash.App.Div.l. 1990)(plaintiff could not maintain action for emotional distress, where 
pleadings indicated that such action occurred outside of his presence); Miles v. State, Child 
Protective Services, DepU 6 P.3d 112 (Wash.App.Div.2 2000)(plaintiff must be present 
when conduct occurred). 
Hatch cannot be found liable for such conduct, when Davis was not present. 
If Hatch is found liable for such conduct, then there would be no limitation to this claim, all 
family members could claim emotional distress. Furthermore, since emotional distress is the 
only damage claimed by Davis, and he has no actual damages, he cannot recover for any 
actions directed to a third person. Restatement (Second) Of Torts § 47. In addition, Hatch 
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was justified in his complaints about the Town as he prevailed against the Town in his 
federal lawsuit. 
E. A jury instruction should have been given regarding the 
"presence requirement" for infliction of emotional distress. 
As set forth above, Davis's claim for emotional distress based on Hatch's 
dealings with his wife should have been dismissed. Evidence of Hatch's dealings with 
Davis's wife, as the Town Clerk, outside of Davis's presence should also have been 
excluded. 
If not excluded, at a minimum, a jury instruction should have been given 
regarding the "presence requirement" before a party can recover for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress based on actions directed towards another party. 
Such a requirement is even more important in this case, where Davis's wife 
is also the Town Clerk and is required to deal with people regarding problems with the 
Town, including business licenses and other permits; and after Hatch prevailed on his rights 
against the Town. 
V. HATCH HAS A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE 
CRITICAL OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND TO 
PETITION HIS GOVERNMENT WITH HIS 
GRIEVANCES. 
Criticism of government is at the very center of the constitutionally protected 
area of free speech. Criticism of those responsible for government operations must be free, 
lest criticism of government itself be penalized. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1996). 
Where criticism is of a public official and their conduct of public business, the interest in 
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private reputation is overborne by the larger public interest, secured by the First 
Amendment. Garrison v. State of La.. 379 U.S. 64 (1964). Even when the utterance is false, 
the great principles of the Constitution, which secure freedom of expression in area of 
criticism of official conduct of public officials, precludes attaching adverse consequences 
to any except the knowing or reckless falsehood. Id. For this reason a public official cannot 
recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress, absent a showing by clear and 
convincing evidence, not only that the publication was false, but uttered with actual malice. 
Hustler Magazine v. FalwelL 485 U.S. 46,108 S.Ct. 876, 99 L,Ed.2d 41 (1988). 
The First Amendment requires clear and convincing evidence that the 
statements published were false and were made with "actual malice, " which does not refer 
to ill will, but rather to knowledge of the falsity.8 West v. Thomson Newspapers, 835 P.2d 
179 (Ut.App. 1992) cert, denied 843 P.2d 1042, vacated on other grounds, 872 P.2d 999; 
Chapin v. Knight-Ridder. Inc.. 993 F.2d 1087 (4th Cir. 1993). Actual malice is required 
otherwise would-be critics of official conduct would remain silent and would be deterred 
from voicing their criticism. Costello v. Ocean County Observer, 643 A.2d 1012 (N.J. 
1994). 
Davis was employed by the State as a park ranger and was a public official. 
§ 63-11-17.2, U.C.A. Therefore, as a citizen, Hatch had a constitutional and right to voice 
his grievances to state officials and elected representatives regarding Davis's actions at the 
8At common law actual malice connoted ill will and a conscious disregard for the rights 
and safety of others; and is constitutionally insufficient to prove actual malice in context of 
public official. Vaanese v. Gall. 518 N.E.2d 1177 (Ohio 1988) cert, denied 487 U.S. 1206. 
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Park. Davis did not allege or establish at trial, by clear and convincing evidence, that 
Hatch's statements were false, or that they were made with "actual malice." Therefore, 
Davis's claim for infliction of emotional distress must fail. The judgment should be 
reversed and the claim dismissed. 
VI. THE TRAIL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING EXPERT 
TESTIMONY AFTER THE COURT PREVIOUSLY 
RULED AT THE PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE THAT 
SUCH TESTIMONY WOULD NOT BE ALLOWED. 
At the Pre-trial Conference the court ruled that Davis's disclosure of his expert 
witness was not sufficient and did not comply with the Rule of Civil Procedure. Davis was 
to provide his expert for a deposition and was to immediately provide the reports. Davis's 
expert never did this and yet was able to testify at trial, contrary to the court's previous 
ruling. 
Hatch's counsel did not have an opportunity to review the reports to rebut them 
or to take the expert's deposition before trial by the end of the week, as previously ordered 
by the court at the Pre-trial Conference. This greatly prejudiced Hatch at trial, and this 
information should have been excluded at trial consistent with the court's previous ruling at 
the Pre-trial Conference. It was an abuse of discretion for the court to allow Davis's expert 
to testify contrary to its previous order. 
VII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT NO 
REAL OR PERSONAL PROPERTY BE TRANSFERRED 
PRIOR TO JUDGMENT UNDER RULE 69(q). 
A. The court failed to follow statutory procedures in 
issuing a prejudgment writ of attachment. 
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Rule 69(q) deals with a person or corporation alleging to have property of the 
judgment debtor, or to be indebted to the judgment debtor. It does not provide for a 
prejudgment order precluding the transfer of any property before a judgment is entered, as 
the April 11,2002 Order does. The proper procedure to follow would have been under Rule 
64A, governing prejudgment attachments and garnishments, which was never followed. 
B. The Order violates Utah's Exemption Statute. 
Furthermore, the April 11, 2002 Order is in violation of Utah's Exemption's 
Act § 78-23-1 et. seg., as it restricts even the transfer of property that is exempt from 
execution and does not provide the opportunity to request a hearing. Even Rule 69(o) which 
applies to judgment debtors, after a final judgment has been entered, only allows the court 
to prohibit the transfer of nonexempt property pending a hearing. Furthermore, the April 
11,2002 Order, was never personally served on Hatch; and Rule 69(d)(e)(f) & (g) requires 
personal service along with notice to the judgment debtor of a right to a hearing. None of 
these procedures were followed and faxing a copy of the Order to Hatch's counsel does not 
comply with the service as required under Rule 69 of the Utah Rule's of Civil Procedure. 
VIII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ISSUING SUPPLEMENTAL 
PROCEEDINGS ON A PARTIAL JUDGMENT, WHICH 
SPECIFICALLY RESERVED ISSUES FOR FURTHER 
DETERMINATION. 
The trial court improperly issued supplemental orders and writs of execution, 
before there was a final judgment entered. This Court in D'Ash ton v. Aston, 844 P.2d 345, 
349 (Ut.App. 1992) states, "it is undisputed that a writ of execution may only be issued on 
a 'final' judgment. The Utah Supreme Court in the case of Cheves v. Williams, 993 P.2d 
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1911 (Utah 1999) also states that under Rule 62(a) and Rule 69(a), regarding executions to 
enforce a judgment, that the obvious implication of both of these provisions is that there 
exists a previously issued final judgment not stayed pending appeal. A judgment which does 
not adjudicate all the claims between the parties is not a final judgment and cannot support 
the issuance of an execution. CIT Financial Services v. Erbs Indoor RV Center, 702 P.2d 
858 (Id.App. 1985)(uncertified partial judgment not being final will not support writ of 
execution); Ketcham v. Selles, 748 P.2d 67 (Or. 1987)(judgment that did not resolve all 
issues between parties was "intermediate order" and was not "judgment" for issuing writ of 
execution). The trial court erred in issuing supplemental proceedings and writs of execution 
on the Partial Judgment, while reserving issues for further determination. These writs 
should be ruled as invalid. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons the Judgment rendered in this case should be set 
aside, Davis's claims should all be dismissed with prejudice; and Hatch should be entitled 
to proceed on his Assault and Battery Claims, without any of Davis's claims pending against 
him. 
DATED this 9Q day of January, 2004. 
BOND & CALL, L.C. 
Attorney for Petitioners and Appellants 
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